Abstract -Collusion-secure codes are used in digital fingerprinting and traitor tracing. Scattering codes were recently introduced by Sebé and Domingo-Ferrer, and used to contstruct a family of codes allegedly collusion-secure against three pirates. We prove that their codes are insecure against optimal pirate strategies, and we present a new secure construction.
Digital fingerprinting [1] and traitor tracing [2] require collusionsecure codes. Each user is identified by a unique codeword from an (n, M) code C, and when he or she buys a copy of a copyrighted work, this codeword is somehow embedded. Illegal copies can be traced back to the copyright pirate.
A collusion of pirates can create copies with a hybrid fingerprint. If they have a set P of fingerprints, they can produce a hybrid from the feasible set F (P ), defined as
If C is (t, )-secure, there is an algorithm A which takes a hybrid fingerprint x as input and outputs one of the pirate fingerprints with probability at least 1 − , as long as there are at most t pirates.
When the codeword is embedded, a random permutation of the underlying code is used. Hence, when the pirates detect a column, they cannot know where it belongs in the codeword. A group of three pirates can distinguish between three different column types, (100), (010), and (001) and their complements. It is generally assumed that the pirates chooses a strategy (p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ), where p i is the probability of outputting the majority bit when pirate i is the minority. This is a safe assumption for long codewords.
The scattering code SC(r, t) [3] is a probabilistic encoding of a single bit. The purpose of the scattering code is two reveil the bit seen by at least two pirates. Supposing p 1 = p 2 = p 3 there is a lower bound p * (r, t) on the probability that the majority bit is output. The scattering codes used in our best constructions have p * (1, 3) = 0.5286.
In the original fingerprinting scheme the scattering code is concatenated with a simplex code. This is not secure when we do not require p 1 = p 2 = p 3 . If the pirates choose a pure strategy (p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ) uniformly at random from (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) , and (0, 0, 1), then all possible three-sets of pirates from a set {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 1 + a 2 + a 3 } give hybrid fingerprints with the same probability distribution. Consequently, any tracing algorithm fails with probability at least 1/4.
We propose a new scheme, where the simplex codes in [3] are replaced by outer codes which are both (2, 2)-and (3, 1)-separating. The minimum and maximum separating weights are bounded in an interval [ 3 ,¯ 3 ]. It is know that such codes can be constructed from duals of BCH codes [4] . For this new scheme, it is possible to prove that there is an optimal pirate strategy with p 1 = p 2 = p 3 . concatenate it with SC(r, t). Suppose r is odd and p * (r, t) ≥ 1/2. Then the concatenated code is 3-secure with -error where
Theorem 1 Let
where
or if this is outside [1,λ] , then ν 1,2 is equal to the closest boundary.
Among the best (3, )-secure codes we find is a (57 330, 2 18 ) with ≤ 10 −16 and (458 745, 2 40 ) with ≤ 10 −148 . Both use an SC(1, 3) inner code; with BCH ⊥ (3) with n = 2 12 − 1 for the first and BCH ⊥ (5) with n = 2 16 − 1 for the second.
There are two comparable schemes in the literature. The one due to Boneh and Shaw [1, 5] requires codewords 10 or 20 times as long as our scheme. Another scheme [6] have approximately the same rate as our scheme, and will be better for some parameters and worse for others. Contrary to Boneh-Shaw, neither our scheme or that from [6] can be easily constructes for arbitrary parameters.
